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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of ,Utah 
R. J. PENMAN, 




Defendant and Respovndew~. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The court rule, requiring respondent to indicate 
whether he agrees with the statement of facts in Appel-
lant's brief, in this particular case, presents a quandary 
to the Respondent. As respondent views the ·pleadings 
and testimony as presented in the trial court, most of 
the relevant facts are without dispute. A reading of 
appellant's brief fails to distinguish between the un-
disputed and dis~puted facts and is so arranged that re-
spondent is lead to the conclusion that in the interest 
of clarity, the rule of the court can best be served by 
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2 
restating the facts and particularly by segregating them 
into the undisputed and disputed categories. 
The plaintiff filed a complaint in the City Court of 
Salt Lake City on September 27, 1945, in which he alleged 
that the defendant became indebted to plaintiff for 
''labor amounting to the sum of $1563.15 and a com-
mission amounting to the sum of $84.55 for a total of 
$1658.05,'' and that defendant has failed to pay any part 
thereof ''save and except the sum of $849.60'' leaving 
a balance of $808.45. (Tr. 13.) To this pleading the de-
fendant filed an answer and counterclaim which as 
amended alleged that the defendant became indebted to 
the plaintiff in th·e sum of $2204.37, but th~t defendant 
had advanced to plaintiff in connection with the work 
done by plaintiff the sum of $2,519.42 CTr. 10) and in a 
counter-claim defendant alleged that there was an agree-
ment between plaintiff and defendant whereby ''defend-
ant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $2.00 per ton for 
transporting scrap material from the Tooele Ordinance 
Plant to defendant's place of business in Salt Lake City 
and plaintiff pursuant to said contract transported 1,669,-
822 pounds of said scrap' material, thereby earning under 
said contract the sum of $1,669.82; that th·ereafter, said 
contract was modified in that defendant agreed to pay 
plaintiff the reasonable value of preparing certain chan-
nel iron, a part of said scrap material, and that plain.tiff 
prepared channel iron, the reasonable value of such rpre-
paration being in the sum of $450.00. '' Defendant also 
admitted that plaintiff earned and was entitled to the 
sum of $84.55 as a commission on the sale of certain 
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scrap n1aterial. Defendant's counter-claiin then alleges 
that defendant had advaneed to plaintiff the sum of 
$2,519.42 and that this "ras $315.10 n1ore than plaintiff 
had earned, and prayed judgment for that amount. (Tr. 
11.) No reply or other pleading 'vas ever filed by ·plain-
tiff to defendant's counter-claim. The case was tried in 
the City Court, appealed to the District Court, the pres-
ent appeal lies from the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and the orders and judgment made and 
entered in the District Court. 
The plaintiff and defendant had enjoyed business 
relationships over a period of eight or nine years. (Tr. 68, 
100.) During most of the time, the 'plaintiff had worked 
for the defendant on a contract basis, sometimes on a 
per-day basis. (Tr. 68.) 'In October, 1943, an oral con-
tract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant 
whereby the defendant was to haul certain scrap steel 
from the Tooele Ordinance Plant to plaintiff's place of 
business. At that time, plaintiff 'vas engaged in the 
trucking business and equipped to haul heavy steel parts. 
Plai~tiff was dealing with Simon Rosenblatt, who rep-
resented the defendant. He went to the Tooele Ordinance 
Plant to view the scrap which was to he hauled into 
defendant's place of business in Salt Lake. (Tr. 69.) The 
scrap consisted of "large fiat plates, some smaller flat 
plates, bolts and settings to put the igloo together," 
(Tr. 70) as well as some steel trusses used to sup~port 
forms _in the construction of igloos. The trusses were 
12 to 14 feet long (Tr. 73) had a five-inch channel iron 
curved across the top, the two ends of the curve were 
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tied together ·by 1%'' pipe or boiler tubing, and there 
were three struts running from the center of the tie up 
to the curved channel iron. (Tr. 74.) 
The contract between plaintiff and defendant ·pro-
vided that plaintiff could haul the steel by either truck 
or rail and for ·each ton delivered at defendant's place 
of business he was to receive $2.00. ( Tr. 70.) If he 
shipped it by rail, the plaintiff had to pay the freight 
charges. (Tr. 71.) 
Between October, 1943 and January, 1944 the plain-
tiff moved from the Tooele Ordinance Plant to defend-
ant's yard in Salt Lake ·City around one and one-half 
to two million pounds of scra'p steel. Some was moved 
by truck and som·e by rail. ( Tr. 71.) That which was 
moved by rail cost the plaintiff sixty-five (65) cents a 
ton freight charges, if he loaded a car to its minimum 
capacity. If the car was not loaded to its minimum, he 
still had to pay the minimum charge for the car, which 
increased the cost per ton. ( Tr. 103.) When plaintiff 
came to haul the steel trusses, he found he could not load 
sufficient to make up a minimum car and plaintiff knew 
that when received at the defendant's yard, the trusses 
were cut up into smaller pieces so that ·it could be re-
melted. ( Tr. 71, 72.) ·so in the first part of January, 
1944 (Tr. 75) plaintiff went to Mr. Rosenblatt repres·ent-
ing defendant and according to plaintiff's testimony the 
following happened: 
Q. And you went to Mr. Rosenblatt and sug-
gested you could cut them as cheap as 'they 
could cut them in their own yard~ 
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5 
.. A.. I didn't say as cheap. 'l said we could cut 
them with a torch out there. 
Q. Did you say that would be as cheap~ 
A. I don ~t think I mentioned the price. I said 
when they come in the yard they would be 
cut. 
Q. You thought by cutting it out there you 
would get a greater tonnage? 
A. We knew it. (Tr. 72.) 
Q.. In order to get greater tonnage, it was to 
your advantage because of the freight you 
had to pay, wasn't that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was to your advantage to cut the trusses 
at Tooele because you could get a greater 
tonnage on your cars. Isn't that right~ 
A. Yes. (Tr. 73.) 
Mr. Ros-enblatt's testimony as to the same conversation 
was recorded as follows : 
Q. He wanted to cut it up so he could load more 
tonnage in the cars,~ · 
A. At his own benefit. ( Tr. 102.) 
Q. What did he say about that~ 
A. I told him at first I didn't think he could do 
it advantageously. He said he could cut it 
much ch~aper out here in the yard than he 
could out there, and he said he (sic.) would 
make a greater difference by loading it in a 
car-if he only got 30,000 in the car his 
freight was $1.30 a car (sic.) instead of 65c 
a ton. 
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Q. What did you tell him' 
A. I told him to go ahead and do that cutting 
and we would make extra allowance to him 
on the job when finished, based on our own 
costs in our own yard. 
Q. Based on your costs' 
A. Yes, certainly. * * • • 
Q. You told him you wouldn't allow him to do 
the cutting where the cost was greater than 
it was in your· own yard' 
A. That is correct. err. 103.) 
Plaintiff proceeded to employ some torchmen to cut 
up the trusses. He paid the men who used the torches 
$1.00 an hour for straight time and $1.50 for over-time. 
(Tr. 76.) The torchmen worked 304 hours straight time, 
63 hours over-time. He paid common labor 80c an 
hour ('Tr. 76) and they worked 133 hours at straight time. 
He paid them $1.20 an hour for four hours over-time. 
(Tr. 77.) He also purchased between $133 and $140 
worth of acetylene (Tr. 78) and made four trips in 
hauling acetylene and oxygen fro~ Salt Lake to Tooele. 
Some of the trips were return hauls from delivering 
scrap' steel and some were not, (Tr. 78) and plaintiff 
testified that the reasonable value of the four trips was 
$25.00 per trip or a total of $100.00. (Tr. 79.) There 
was no dispute in the testimony concerning the number 
of hours worked or as to whether they were paid for 
at straight time or over-time. The difference was that 
plaintiff sought to establish that the reasonable value 
of cutting the trusses at Tooele should not be the amount 
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\Yhirh he had to pay for labor, acetylene and oxygen, but 
that cutters' \vages should be figured at $3.00 an hour 
instead of the $1.00 paid, and $4.50 overtime instead of 
the $1.50 paid, and that common labor should be $2.00 
an hour straight time and $3.00 overtime. ('Tr. 64, 65, 69.) 
About February 15, 1944, the oral contract upon which 
the ·parties had been working came to an end because 
~Ir. Penman \\~as not delivering the required tonnage. 
He hadn't been on the job all the time and hadn't been 
cutting any additional trusses or hauling any. (Tr. 108, 
109.) During the term of the contract, that is, from 
October, 1943 to February 15, 1944, Mr. Penman had 
been paid by the defendant a total of $1800.00 in cash. 
(Tr. 105.) These payments had been made at irregular 
times, generally on Saturdays when he needed money to 
meet payroll and pay bills. (Tr. 104.) In addition to 
that, he had charged to the defendant materials, prin-
cipally oxygen and acetylene to the amount of $163.02, 
and the defendant had paid freight charges on rail ship-
ments from Tooele to the extent of $556.40, making a 
total advanced by defendant upon the contract during 
the term thereof of $2,519.42. (Tr. 105.) On February 
15, after the plaintiff had quit hauling, he met with Mr. 
Rosenblatt, rep·resenting the defendant. Mr. Rosenblatt 
presented to him a statement which is in evidence as 
Exhibit ''A,'' showing the number of pounds of material 
shipped by rail and that hy truck, cash advanced, and 
that before any allowance was made for cutting the 
channel pipe that the plaintiff was overdrawn to the 
amount of $849.60. On the bottom of the statement 
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appeared the following: ''Special allowance yet to be 
ma.de for cutting channel ~pipes.'' From what the evi-
dence discloses, this statement was accepted by plain-
tiff and not questioned, and plaintiff at no time ever 
submitted to defendant a statement as to what he thought 
was the reasonable value of services rendered in cutting 
the pipe at Tooele. (Tr. 106.) 
The foregoing, in the opinion of counsel for respond-
ent, constitutes a statement of the undisputed facts as 
disclosed by the pleadings and evidence as they relate 
to the merits of the law suit as disposed of by the Honor-
able Clarence E. Baker . .Appellant, however, has by his 
appeal questioned the order of the Honorable Roald 
A. Hogansen entered June 16, 1947 (Tr. 26.) denying 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal to the 
District Court from the ·City Court of Salt Lake City. 
The facts relative to this matter are as follows: The 
judgment in the City Court was made and entered the 
29th day of January, 1947. (Tr. 8.) No notice of judg-
ment was ever served by plaintiff upon defandant. 
On the 7th day of February, 1947, plaintiff duly 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County a notice of appeal. (Tr. 4.) At the same time 
that the notice of appeal was filed with the clerk of the 
District Court, counsel for defendant tendered to the 
clerk of the court the statutory filing fee for said appeal, 
hut the clerk there and then refused to accept said filing 
fee and alleged as grounds that the records from the 
City Court had not yet been received from the clerk of 
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the City (~ourt. The clerk agreed to notify eounsel for 
defendant as soon as the record from the clerk of the 
City Court had been received. The clerk never at any 
time adYised counsel for defendant (Tr. 18, 19.) that 
the record from the City Court had been received. 
On I\la~y· 28, 1947, counsel for plaintiff, without notice 
to defendant, presented a motion to dismiss defendant's 
appeal from the City Court and the Honorable Roald 
A. Hogansen entered an 'Order dis1nissing said app·eal 
and ordering the files and records to be returned to the 
City Court. (Tr. 3.) Thereafter, on June 5, 1947, defend-
ant served and filed a motion to reinstate the appeal and 
relieve defendant from default for failure to pay filing 
fees as provided ·by law, on the grounds that notice of 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss had not been served on de-
fendant and upon other equitable grounds, which motion 
was served upon counsel for plaintiff and an affidavit 
setting forth, the tender of filing fee and the refusal of 
the clerk to accept same, clerk's agreement to notify 
counsel for defendant, and his failure to do so was served 
and filed in support of said motion. (Tr. 18, 19.) On 
June 11, ·the matter was argued before the Honorable 
Roald A. Hogansen. 
There is also in the file an Affidavit and Motion of 
·plaintiff filed June 11, 1948. ( Tr. 23.) This asks the 
court to dismiss the appeal. It does not show that notice 
of this motion was given defendant, which accounts for 
the vacuum in the transcript relative to the facts as they 
exist at that time, and the reasons that motivated the 
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judge in denying the motion. The Honorable Roald A. 
Hogansen set aside the order dismissing defendant's 
appeal and refused to grant plaintiff's motion of June 
11 to dismiss the appeal. (Tr. 26.) 
ARGUMENT 
The first problem is to determine the terms of the 
contract sued upon by ~plaintiff. It is undisputed that 
the original contract was entered into in October, 1943, 
which was substantially as follows: 
1. Plaintiff was going to haul certain scrap steel 
from the ·Tooele Ordinance Plant to defendant's yard 
in Salt Lake City. 
2. Plaintiff had the choice of shipping it by rail 
or hauling it by truck; in either event the transportation 
charges were paid by plaintiff. 
3. For this service, defendant was to pay plaintiff 
the sum of $2.00 per ton delivered at its yard. 
It seems that by January, 1944, plaintiff had loaded 
and transported most of the smaller and heavier pieces 
of steel which made up heavy cars leaving the trusses. 
This fact is demonstrable· hy the description of the ma-
terials given by plaintiff ('Tr. 70) and the fact that he 
testified that the reason for going to the defendant and 
asking if the trusses could be cut up· was because a car 
of trusses failed to meet the minimum weight require-
ments of the railroad. (Tr. 72, 73.) In other words, the 
alteration in the agreement made in January, 1944 was 
not only at the instance of the plaintiff, but for plaintiff's 
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benefit and in the modification or change in the agree-
Inent, there 'Yas no advantage to defendant. Now, the 
tern1s of the alteration seen1 to be rather clear, that is, 
that the defendant "~as going to pay plaintiff in addi-
tion to the loading and trans~portation charge of $2.00 
a ton son1e reasonable amount for cutting up the trusses. 
The only dispute seems to be the reasonableness of 
the amount which was to bear some relationship to de-
fendant's cost of cutting the trusses in their own yard. 
Mr. Rosenblatt for defendant testified, and very clearly, 
that when ~fr. Penman came in, he first told him he 
didn't think he could cut the trusses out at Tooele any 
cheaper than they could be done in the yard. Penman 
insisted that he could and then Mr. Rosenblatt told him-
''I told him he could go ahead and do that cutting and 
we would make an extra allowance to him when the job 
was finished based on our costs in our own yard.'' (Tr. 
103.) In any event, most plaintiff should recover for 
cutting the trusses is a reasonable amount. 
Defendant maintains that in determining reasonable-
ness the following must be taken into account, first, that 
the alteration in the contract was at the instance of the 
plaintiff, so that he could load minimum tonnages on 
freight cars and avoid paying higher than 65c a ton 
transportation charge; second, that human experience 
would indicate that a person situated as was defend-
ant would not have voluntarily, and without any con-
sideration, consent to pay more for having a job done 
at Tooele than defendant was then and there able and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
actually doing in Salt Lake. Now, let us look at the fi-
gures for just a moment. The plaintiff actually p-aid out 
by way of money to cut the trusses which he did cut at 
Tooele according to his own testimony the following 
sums: 
Wages for torchmen straight time .... $304.00 
Overtime Wages for torchmen____________ 94.50 
Wages for day labor---------------------------- 106.40 
Overtime for day labor________________________ 4.80 
For acetylene gas ------------~: __________________ 133.00 
For oxygen gas ------------------------------------ 61.60 
In addition thereto claimed for trans-
portation of materials from iSalt 
Lake to Tooele even though part 
of this was a back haul, after the 
delivery of steel under the trans-
portation contact the sum of ________ 100.00 
TOTAL ________________________________ $804.30 
Now, this was the plaintiff's actual expenses accord-
ing to his own testimony and it may have been higher 
than defendant's cost of cutting the same scrap in its 
own yard because, first, at the time the agreement was 
entered into Mr. Rosenblatt told plaintiff that he thought 
it would cost more to cut at Tooele than in defendant's 
yard ('Tr. 103) and, second, because plaintiff was not 
skilled or experienced in cutting scrap. and preparing it 
for re-melting. His business was that of trucking. (Tr. 
69.) 
Now, by way of contrast, plaintiff sought to have 
the court believe £hat the reasonable value of cutting 
the trusses at Tooele should be for him to be paid $3.00 
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an hour for torehmen instead of the $1.00 he actually 
paid. Plaintiff testified that the reasonable value of 
cutting \Yas as is hereinbelo'v in Column One set forth, 




Torchmen-straight time ________________ $3.00 
Torchmen-over time______________________ 4.50 
Common labor-straight time________ 2.00 
Common labor-over time______________ 3.00 
Wages Actually 






The difference in the claim of plaintiff and defendant's 
·position accounts for the entire difference between the 
amount sued for by plaintiff, to-wit, the sum of $1,658.05 
and the amount found by the court as being reasonable 
for the services rendered, to-wit, the sum of $804.30. 
True enough, plaintiff produced a witness, by name, 
Startup, who had had limited experience with torch 
operation who attempted to testify that $3.00 per hour 
was a reasonable charge. 
On the other hand, defendant produced Rufus Erick-
son, a welder who had been in the business since 1928 · 
(Tr. 88) who testified that he had cut these trusses in 
the defendant's yard and had cut off as many as 130 
pipes in an eight-hour shift (Tr. 89). That he was paid 
at the rate of 95c an hour. He only made five cuts instead 
of eight, the five cuts being to sever the tie across the 
bottom of the arch. For the purposes of illustration, 
let us reduce the problem to one of cuts. Let us reduce 
the average number of cuts from 130 trusses that Mr. 
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Erickson could do to 100 trusses per eight hour shift. 
Then let us increase Mr. Erickson's hourly rate from 
95c to $1.00 which plaintiff p·aid his men. We have a 
situation something like this. In an eight-hour day, Mr. 
Erickson made 500 cuts or 65.5 cuts per hour. Now, 
on the 1900 trusses that Mr. Penman claims he cut there 
would be a total of eight times that number or 15,200 
cuts. Now dividing this by 65.5 we get 232 houts or a 
total labor cost of $232.00. The court allowed Mr. Pen-
man $304.00 for this particular item. 
So, it is res·pectfully submitted that there was more 
than ample testimony to support the findings made by 
the court that the actual award made to plaintiff for the 
work done there was his cost. His profit should have 
come from the advantage to him of being able to load 
1ninimum weight cars and thereby keep his freight cost 
to a minimum. As a last item, we must call to the court's 
attention the fact that a statement was rendered defend-
ant by plaintiff on the 15th day of February, 1944, which 
showed that plaintiff was indebted to defendant in the 
sun1 of $849.60 and also made mention of the fact that 
no allowance had yet been made for cutting the channel 
pipe. The ·plaintiff at no time ever submitted a state-
ment to defendant as to what he thought was a reaaonable 
amount or how a reasonable amount could be arrived at 
and the plaintiff let the matter go until Septemhe·r 25, 
1945 or for more than a year and a half before taking 
any steps in connection with it at all, and even then made 
no written demand upon plaintiff or ever suggested an 
amount which was reasonable. It seems ·entirely pro-
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bable that plaintiff·s reason In letting the n1atter go 
for so long "Tas because he believed the amount of the 
cutting he did 'vas "\Yorth less than the amount $849.60 
which he owed defendant and thought it would be well 
· • to let. a sleeping dog lie.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that the findings of 
the court are clearly supported by the testimony and 
the preponderance thereof and on its merits the case 
should be affirmed. 
The appellant apparently assigns as error the order 
of Judge Hogansen under date of June 16, 1947 deny-
ing plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's ap,peal. 
It will be recalled that on May 28, 1947 Judge Hogansen 
entered an ex parte order dismissing the appeal and 
ordering the ·papers returned fo the clerk of the City 
Court. On June 5th a motion to reinstate the appeal and 
relieve the defendant of default was served and filed. 
The first ground for setting aside the order was that 
the order of dismissal had been made without notice 
to the defendant. On June 11, 1947, Judge Hogansen 
granted the motion to set aside the order of dismissal 
on that ground. (Tr. 25.) The only question left goes 
to the propriety of Judge Hogansen's order of June 16, 
1947 denying ·p·laintiff's Affidavit and Motion filed June 
11th asking that the appeal be dismissed. (Tr. 23.) It 
will be noted that this Affidavit and Motion and the 
entire record fails to show that any notice was given 
defendant. The record, however, does show a minute 
entry (Tr. 25) that counsel for the defendant was present 
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at the time pl~intiff presented and filed the Affidavit 
and Motion and that it was agreed to proceed and hear 
the n1otion. 'The motion was made pursuant to Section 
104-77-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1'943, the pertinent part 
of ,vhich is as follows: ''An ap,peal may he dismissed, 
on notice, in the discretion of the court, for any of the 
following causes : ( 1) 'That the papers were not filed 
in the district court and the advance fee required therefor 
paid within thirty days after the transcript was received 
by the clerl{. '' Now, for an understanding of the prob-
lem, we must also refer to the manner of taking an 
appeal from the City Court. Section 104-77-3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943 referring to the appeal, says: ''The 
a·ppeal shall be taken by filing a notice thereof with the 
justice, or in the clerk's office of the district court to 
which the appeal is taken and serving a copy on the ad-
verse party.'' In the case at bar, the notice was captioned 
and filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County and copy was served upon plaintiff. Sec-
tion 104-77-5 Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides: "Upon 
filing the notice of a'ppeal and undertaking required in 
the next succeeding section, or up:on receivim.g notice 
fr~om t'he cZerk of t:he district coU+rt that the appeal has 
been filed and perfected in the clerk's office and the pay-
ment of the fees of the justice for making the transcript, 
the justice shall within five days transmit to the clerk-
etc.'' Now what happ.ened in this rna tter is set forth 
i~ the affidavit in support of a motion to reinstate ap~ 
peal (Tr. 18, 19} where affiant says: "That on or about 
the 7th day of Feburary, 1947, he filed on behalf of said 
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defendant notice of appeal and undertaking on appeal-. 
tha.t on said February 7, 1947, he tendered to the clerk 
of the district court of the Third Judicial Distric.t in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah check in payment 
of statutory filing fee of said appeal; that the clerk then 
and there refused to accept said check because the record 
in the City Court of Salt Lake ·City had not been filed; that 
said notice and undertaking on appeal were left with 
the clerk of said court with the understanding that when 
the c.lerk received the record from the clerk of the ·city 
Court the attorneys for defendant would be notified and 
the payment of fees would then be made.'' 
The affidavit continues to the effect that no noticH 
of any nature was ever given by the clerk of the City 
Court that the record on appeal had been received in the 
clerk's office. It is noted that under Section 104-77-5 
there is no time specified, in which the clerk of the dis-
trict court, after receiving notice of appeal and under-
taking, must notify the clerk of the City ·court, so here-
in we have a complete hiatus, in which not only several 
days but several months could elapse before the clerk 
of the C~ty Court is notified and before the transcript 
on appeal ~s forwarded to the clerk of the District Court. 
In the case of 
Christenslern v. Christensen, 173 Pac. 383, Utah 
1918, 
the statement of facts disclose that the notice of 
appeal was filed with the clerk of the District Court 
on the 22nd day of December, 1917 and the record on 
appeal was not filed with the clerk of the District Court 
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until the 9th day of February, 1918. 
It is quite apparent that the designers and drafters 
in the code of civil procedure in the State of Utah have 
endeavored to devise a scheme by which the party with 
knowledge of the facts must advise the other party before 
any advantage can be taken of that fact: witness, re-
quirem·ent for serving notices of court action upon de-
murers, motions, etc., when the opposing party is not 
p·resent, requirements of serving notice of judgment, 
cost bills, notices of appeal, etc. In this instance, how-
ever, the burden is upon the appellant from the City 
Court or Justice's Court to determine when the trans-
cript on appeal from the Justice's or City Court is re-
ceived in the District Court, and we recognize there is 
no legal justification for relying upon the promise of the 
clerk to notify you when it is received, but it does seem 
to be a perfectly human thing to do. 
Section 104-77-9 above cited supra. clearly makes it 
discretionary with the court as to whether a cause may be 
dismissed for failing to pay the fee within thirty days 
after the transcript is received by the clerk. The sentence 
uses the word "may" be dismissed and also says in the 
''discretion'' of the court. The court in the case of 
Benson v. Ritchie, 230 Pac. 572, 64 Utah 278, 
,Utah 1924, 
in passing upon this same section said ''No doubt some 
discretion is vested in the District Court for the reason 
that a motion to dismiss an ap~peal may be interpos·ed 
on the 31st day after the papers have been received by 
the clerk, and it may be made to appear while such is 
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the fact, there, nevertheless is some good and legal cause 
·w·hy the fee was not paid strictly within the thirty days 
or that there is some other valid reason why the appeal 
should not be dismissed. ' ' In the case of 
Little v. B~ank, 87 Pac. 708, 31 Utah 222, 
Utah 1906, 
cited by appellant the court recognized that an adequate 
excuse would justify the court in refusing to deny a 
motion to dismiss wher·e the court said at th·e end of 
the opinion ''at least there is no adequate ·excuse offered 
as to why these things were not done within the time 
the law requires they shall be done. Under these cir-
cumstances, we do not think it was an abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the court in dismissing the appeal.'' 
We believe, as counsel for the defendant, that w,e 
have read all of the Utah cases which have construed or 
dealt in any way with the section under consideration 
and aside from those dealing with jurisdiction, the appel-
late court has in all instances seen fit to affirm the dis-
cretion of the trial court. There is no adequate record 
of the proceedings which occurred before the trial judge 
relative to the argument and discussion surrounding 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal. The following 
can only be suggested from the record: The complaint 
was filed Sepitember 27, 1945, the answer and counter-
claim January 10, 1946. No trial date was fixed until 
January 24, 1947, over a year after the case was at issue. 
And also that although defendant's motion to dismiss was 
denied June 16, and notice of that fact given to plaintiff 
on June 17, still no demand for trial was made until 
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October 15, 194 7, so clearly there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that plaintiff was in any hurry to get the case 
dis,posed of or that any prejudice· occurred to plaintiff 
by reason of the delay caused by defendant failing to dis-
cover that the record on appeal had been transmitted 
from the clerk of the City ;Court to the Clerk o~ the Dis-
trict Court. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment ar·e well 
founded and supported in the testimony and clearly by 
the great pre~ponderance thereof. Plaintiff has failed to 
show any abuse of discretion by the District Court in 
denying his motion to dismiss. It. is r:e:Spectfully sub-
mitted that the judgment should be affirm,ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MoFFAT & MABEY, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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